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UNITED STATES OBJECTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
A PARADOX OF 
"OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM" 
REMIGIUS CHIBUEZE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most historic events of the last century was the establishment 
of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) after almost five 
decades of failed efforts. I About 160 countries and a wide representation 
of nongovernmental organizations converged at the UN Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries (held in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to 
July 17, 1998) to finalize and adopt a statute to establish an international 
criminal court.2 At the end of the conference, on July 17, 1998 members 
* Attorney-at-Law, San Francisco; Solicitor & Advocate of the Supreme Court of Nigeria; 
SJ.D. Candidate, LL.M. (expected May 2003) Intellectual Property Law, Golden Gate University 
School of Law, San Francisco; LL.M., University of Alberta, Canada; LL.B (Hons.), University of 
Benin, Nigeria. 
This Paper was initially presented at the Twelfth Annual Fulbright Symposium and the 
Eleventh Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law on Thursday, March 28. 
2002 at Golden Gate University School of Law. San Francisco. 
I. See CHERIF BASSIOUNI. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998). where he noted that "since the end of World War I (1919). the 
world community has sought to establish a permanent international criminal court." 
2. For a complete list of states and organizations represented at the Conference. see Final Act 
of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Coun, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. NCONF.183/1O, Annex II, ill (1998) 
[hereinafter Diplomatic Conference]. 
19 
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of the diplomatic conference voted 120 to 7 in favor of adopting the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).3 
There has been tremendous success in the signing and ratification of the 
ICC Statute. To date, 139 countries have signed and 89 countries, 
encompassing countries from all regions of the globe, have ratified the 
statute,4 which took effect on July 1, 2002 after being ratified by more 
than 66 countries.5 This remarkable support for the ICC demonstrates 
the direction of a new world order and the recognition that international 
justice and the fight against impunity require the cooperation and 
consensus of nations. 
The Court will exercise complementary jurisdiction with national courts 
over individuals accused of committing egregious international crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 6 The ICC is a 
permanent adjudicatory institution for the crimes contained in the 
Genocide and the four Geneva Conventions, and related international 
instruments as particularized in the ICC Statute.7 The Court's 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is suspended until an acceptable 
definition is agreed upon by member states.s Terrorism and drug-related 
crimes were adopted into the text in an annexed resolution and will 
become part of the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction once it is 
defined at a review conference in the future. 
3. The Rome Statute o/the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 183/9 (July 17, 
1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute). 
4. The countries that have ratified the Statute are: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua & 
Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, 
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
Zambia. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at 
http://untreaty.un.orglEnglishlbiblel englishinternetbiblelpartIlchapterXVIIIItreatylO.asp (visited 
Feb. 18,2003) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties). 
5. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when 
ratified by 60 countries. 
6. Id., art. I. 
7. Id., art. 5(1). 
8. Id., art. 5(2). 
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The ICC is built upon the principles enunciated in the Nuremberg,9 
Yugoslavia,1O and Rwandan ad hoc tribunals. 11 The ICC is not expected 
to bring an automatic end to these abominable crimes, but will offer a 
permanent forum to prosecute those accused of gross international 
crimes when national systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute. 
Therefore, the ICC as a permanent institution will serve as a constant 
remainder to violators of international crimes that they will be held 
accountable for their actions. 12 
While most countries declared their support for the ICC, the U.S. was not 
in favor of signing the statute and therefore voted against it, along with 
six other states, including China, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya. 13 
However, in his last days in office, former President Bill Clinton 
authorized U.S. signature on December 31, 2000 in order to reaffirm 
U.S. "strong support for international accountability and for bringing to 
justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity." 14 
This reaffIrmation of strong support for international accountability was, 
however, not backed with a commitment to ratify the statute. The former 
president indicated that his administration had no intention of submitting 
the statute to the Senate for ratifIcation. IS Notwithstanding the 
President's assurance that he would not seek senate ratifIcation, Senator 
Jesse Helms (R-NC), who was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman at that time, was reported to have informed then Secretary of 
9. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals (Nuremberg, September 30 - October 1, 1946),41 AM. 1. INT'L L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter 
Nuremberg Judgment]. 
10. See The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 3217th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The 
ICTY Statute was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, May 25,1993, 
for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. See also S.c. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48 th Sess., 
3217 th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827(l993), reprinted in 32 LL.M. 1203 (1993). 
11. See Security Council Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453,d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted 
in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1194) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The ICTR was set up to prosecute those 
responsible for the genocidal war in Rwanda. 
12. David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Coun, 35 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J. 47, 51-52 (2002). 
13. Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute 
of Rome, 95 AM. J.INT'L L. 124 (2001). See also, Diplomatic Conference, supra note 2. 
14. William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on the Signature of the International Criminal Court 
Treaty, Washington, D.C. 1 (Dec. 31, 2000), at http://www.state.gov/www/globaU 
swcilOO1231_c1inton_icc.html (visited Apr. 10,2002). 
15. Id. 
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State Madeline Albright that the ICC treaty "will be dead on arrival."16 
He boasted that "if I do nothing else this year, I will make certain that 
President Clinton's outrageous and unconscionable decision to sign the 
Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court is reversed 
and repealed."I? 
The U.S. position has not changed under the current administration of 
President George W. Bush who has indicated an even stronger 
unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC. The Bush administration 
carried out a policy review of the International Criminal Court, and on 
May 6, 2002, the administration took the controversial step of nullifying 
the United States' signature to the ICC Statute:s Also, on August 5, 
2002, President Bush signed into law the American Service-members' 
Protection Act (ASPA):9 ASPA forbids the government from 
cooperating with the Court and authorizes "any necessary action" 
including the use of force to free any American soldiers who may be held 
in custody by the Court.20 The ASP A is now referred to in international 
circles as the "Hague Invasion Act" because of the possibility of the use 
of force against the Court. 21 
United States opposition to the ICC raises many questions, as it 
contradicts the U.S. record as a leading participant in the Nuremberg 
trials of accused war criminals following World War II; as a key 
supporter of the tribunals trying those that committed genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia; and as an early proponent of creating a permanent court.22 It 
should be recalled that on March 25, 1998, when President Bill Clinton 
visited genocide survivors in Rwanda, he explained that the problems of 
ad hoc tribunals demonstrated the need for a permanent international 
16. Senator Jesse Helms, Towards a Compassionate Conservative Foreign Policy, Address to 
the American Enterprise Institute 10 (Jan. 11, 2001) at http.llwww.senate.gov/-foreignl 
2000/proOI1201.htm. 
17. [d. 
18. Also, on August 28, 2002 Israel informed the U.N. Secretary-General that it has no legal 
obligations arising from its signature of the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000. See Multilateral 
Treaties, supra note 4. 
19. See Richard Dicker, Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law - White House Stops at Nothing in 
Campaign Against War Crimes Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH - HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS (Aug. 3, 
2002) available at http://www.hrw.org/pressl2oo2l08/aspa080302.htm. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword 
Mightier Than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 213, 239-240 (2000); Roseann M. Latore, Escape 
Out the Back Door or Charge in the Front Door: U.S. Reactions to the International Criminal 
Court, 25 B.c. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 159, 160 (2002). 
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court to deal with crimes like the Rwandan genocide.23 He, therefore, 
pledged that "the United States will work to see that it is created." 24 
The Bush administration's hostility to the ICC contrasts sharply with its 
efforts to create a coalition to combat terrorism in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. As a build up for the war, "Operation 
Enduring Freedom," President Bush divided the world into two; those 
with America and the countries opposing it.25 It is ironic that while those 
countries the U.S. abandoned at the Rome Conference are in coalition 
with the Bush administration to fight impunity (the very reason they 
support the ICC Statute), some of the countries that voted with the U.S. 
against the ICC Statute are today on the other side of "Operation 
Enduring Freedom." 
The coming together of allies to support the U.S. in pursuit of "Operation 
Enduring Freedom" is another indication that this is not the kind of 
action that the ICC was meant to undermine. In a White House 
memorial marking six months since the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
President George W. Bush acknowledged the efforts of these nations that 
deployed forces or provided logistics and other supports for "Operation 
Enduring Freedom" and declared that the United States could not have 
done its work without support from these countries.26 However, his 
administration has not deemed it necessary to cooperate with the same 
countries that support the U.S.'s "Operation Enduring Freedom" by 
building support for the ICC towards creating a permanent institution of 
justice to punish the likes of the perpetrators of the September 11 attack. 
There is no doubt that the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States were crimes against humanity as contained in the Rome Statute?7 
Therefore, if the ICC had existed on that date, it would have had 
jurisdiction to punish those responsible for the terrorist assaults on the 
23. Remarks of President Clinton to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and U.S. and 
Rwandan Government Officials (Mar. 28, 1998) (transcripts available at Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights - The Case for U.S. Support, http://www.lchr.org/featurel50th/uspos.htm) (visited 
Mar. 6, 2002). 
24. [d. 
25. President' George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Sept 20, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2001l09/20010920-8.htrnl). See also, President George W. Bush, No Nation Can be Neutral 
in this Conflict, Remarks by the President to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism (Nov. 
06, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001l11/20011I06-
2.html). 
26. President George W. Bush, President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts, 
Remarks by the President on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September II th Attacks (Mar. II, 
2002) (transcript available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2002/03120020311-I.htrnl). 
27. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art 6. 
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United States.28 Paradoxically, while the United States is leading the rest 
of the world in the war against terrorism after the wake of September .11, 
2001,29 it is also leading and instigating opposition to frustrate the 
effective operation of the ICC.30 
This inconsistent position taken by the United States is the thesis of this 
paper. Part II of the paper summarizes the background and scope of the 
ICC. In part III, the paper discusses U.S. grounds for opposing the ICC 
and argues that those grounds offer no valid reason for the United States 
refusal to join the international community effort to establish a 
permanent criminal court to ensure that those who commit the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are held accountable 
for their actions. Part IV examines specific steps taken by the United 
States to undermine the court, and evaluates the effect of U.S. opposition 
to the ICC. Part V concludes inter alia, that U.S. desire for a unipolar 
superpower regime will adversely affect United States interest in the long 
run, even if it provides any short term benefits. 
II. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
A. BACKGROUND TO THE CREA nON OF THE ICC 
As Dr. Koffi Annan UN Secretary-General observed: 
For nearly half a Century ... almost as long as the United 
Nations has been in existence ... the General Assembly has 
recognized the need to establish such a court to prosecute and 
punish persons responsible for crimes such as genocide. Many 
thought ... that the horrors of the Second World War... the 
camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the Holocaust ... could 
never happen again. And yet they have. In Cambodia, in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in Rwanda. Our time ... this decade even ... 
has shown us that man's capacity for evil knows no limits. 
Genocide ... is now a word of our time, too, a heinous reality 
that calls for a historic response.3) 
28. Scheffer, supra note 12, at 49. 
29. [d. at 54. 
30. See discussions infra Part IV. 
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Overview, at 
http://www.un.orgllaw/icdgeneraVoverview.htm (visited Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter ICC 
Overview]. 
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Commentators trace the history of an international criminal court to the 
early nineteenth century. In 1872, Gustav Moynier, one of the founders 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, proposed a permanent 
court in response to the crimes of the Franco-Prussian War.32 There was 
little effort in this regard until the events of World War II and its 
aftermath reminded the international community that a permanent 
criminal court is a requirement of our society. After the Nuremberg 
Judgment of 1946 there was renewed interest which resulted in the 
establishment of an International Law Commission (ILC).33 Through 
resolution 260 of December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly invited 
the ILC "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an 
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with 
genocide."34 
After preliminary findings, the Commission came to the conclusion that 
the establishment of an international court to try persons charged with 
genocide or similar crimes was both desirable and possible. The UN 
General Assembly established a committee to prepare proposals relating 
to the establishment of such a court. The committee prepared a draft 
statute in 1951 which was revised in 1953. The General Assembly 
decided to postpone consideration of the draft statute ostensibly pending 
the adoption of a definition of aggression. However, it was understood 
that the then-prevailing Cold War stymied efforts at moving ahead with 
such a project. 
In 1989, the UN General Assembly was once again called to reconsider 
the issue of a permanent court following the request of Trinidad and 
Tobago for an international court with jurisdiction to try international 
drug traffickers. In response to that request, the General Assembly 
mandated the ILC to recommence its work on the proposed Court with 
jurisdiction to include drug trafficking.35 
Meanwhile, gross acts of ethnic cleansing were taking place in the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia, while genocidal war continued unabated 
in Rwanda. These developments shocked the conscience of the 
international community and jolted them into action. Thus, in an effort 
to bring an end to widespread disregard of the laws of war which leads to 
unprecedented war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the 
32. Beth K. Lamont, The International Criminal Court, 58 HUMANIST (1998) available at 
www.corliss-1arnont.orglhsrnny/icc.htm (last revised Jan. 22, 2003). 
33. G.A Res. 260 (ill), U.N. Doc. N81O, at 174 (1948). 
34. Id. 
35. Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Coun: The Obstacles to 
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 297 (1998). 
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UN Security Council established an ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and for Rwanda in 1994, to 
hold individuals accountable for those atrocities and to deter similar 
crimes in the future.36 
On the other hand, the inability of the United Nations to create additional 
ad hoc tribunals to adjudicate international crimes committed in 
Cambodia during the Pol Pot regime of 1975-79,37 during the factional 
and guerilla warfare for the ouster and replacement of Samuel Doe in 
Sierra Leone from 1996 to the present,38 and in East Timor in 199939 
suggests that ad hoc tribunals may not always be available when 
needed.40 
These developments engendered a state of urgency for the n..C, 
considering that the twentieth century has been the bloodiest in human 
history. The conflicts that took place in the last decade which are 
primarily internal, demonstrated tragically that there was a continuing 
need to take measures to put an end to abominable crimes.41 Thus, in 
1994 the n..C presented a draft statute on an international criminal court 
(ICC) to the UN General Assembly.42 The General Assembly then set 
up an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International 
36. ICTY Statute, supra note 10. Also see, ICTR Statute, supra note 11. 
37. See G.A. Res. 521135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. N521644/Add.2 (1997), 
available at http://www.un.orglgaldocumentslgares521res52135.htm. The resolution requested the 
UN Secretary General and the Cambodian government work together in order to address past serious 
violations of Cambodian and international law. See also Report of the Group of Experts for 
Cambodia Established Pursuant to G.A. Res. 521135, U.N. Doc. Al53/400 (1998), available at 
hnp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-I999.html (Feb. 18, 1999). The Report recommended 
that members of the Pol Pot regime could be held criminally responsible through domestic trials, a 
tribunal under Cambodian law, a United Nations tribunal, and a Cambodian tribunal under United 
Nations administration. 
38. See S.c. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55 th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. SlRES/1315 (2000). The 
Resolution requested the UN Secretary General to issue a report concerning the establishment of a 
special court in order to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in Sierra Leone. See also 
Report of the UN Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. 
Doc. S/2000/915, at 13 (2000) providing the legal framework and requisite administrative elements 
for the creation of a Sierra Leonean special court. Also see Res. 1370, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 3, 
U.N. Doc. SlRES/1370 (2001). The Resolution encourages the UN Secretary General, the 
government of Sierra Leone and others involved "to expedite the establishment of ... the Special 
Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000." 
39. See U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, Reg. 2000115, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
UNT AETIREGI2000/15 (2000) available at http://www.un.orglpeaceletimor/untaetRIRegOOI5E.pdf 
establishing a special panel of judges to address serious criminal offences committed in East Timor. 
40. Various reasons were offered for the failure - financial burden to lack of cooperation from 
successive governments in these countries. 
41. Phillippe Kirsch, Q.C., The International Criminal coun: Current Issues and Perspectives, 
64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,4 (2001). 
42. Pejic, supra note 35, at 298. 
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Criminal Court to consider major substantive issues arising from the ILC 
draft.43 
After the Ad Hoc Committee's report, the General Assembly set up a 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (PreCom) to prepare a consolidated draft text for submission to a 
diplomatic conference. PreCom organized several meetings from 1996 
to 1998 which were attended by governments, international law experts, 
and non-governmental organizations (NOOs). In its final session, held in 
March and April of 1998, the Committee completed the drafting of the 
ICC text. 
Since Italy had in 1996 offered to host an ICC Conference, the General 
Assembly, at its fifty-second session decided to convene the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 
17 1998, "to finalize and adopt a convention on the establishment of an 
international criminal court." In his opening speech to the Conference, 
the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kofi Annan, noted as follows: 
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise 
of universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this 
vision. We are close to its realization. We will do our part to 
see it through till the end. We ask you ... to do yours in our 
struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army 
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will 
the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, 
may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, 
and that those who violate those rights will be punished.44 
Unlike the previous ad hoc tribunals -- Nuremberg, Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda -- the groundwork for the ICC Statute was done by the UN 
General Assembly and the International Law Commission rather than 
individual states. Their aim was to develop a code of offenses and to 
elaborate a statute for an independent international criminal jurisdiction. 45 
Although the U.S. signed the statute at the last opportunity on December 
31, 2000, the United States' vote against the adoption of the statute 
leaves a sour taste. 
43. [d. 
44. ICC Overview, supra note 31. 
45. Jonathan Stanley, Focus: International Criminal Court: A Court that Knows No 
Boundaries?: The International Criminal Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver 
what it Promises?, THE LAWYER, Aug. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9167987. 
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B. JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF THE ICC 
1. Genocide 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute provides that an accused shall be gUilty of 
the crime of genocide as defined in the Statute if committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
groups. The definition corresponds to the pertinent provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1948. It has been argued that the crimes of 
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet would not meet the ICC 
Statute's definition of Genocide because he allegedly targeted 
individuals due to their politics rather than their race or religion.46 For 
this reason, the Rome Conference should have considered the need to 
expand the definition of Genocide beyond that of the 1948 Geneva 
Convention to include acts of genocide directed against members of an 
opposing political group and social groupS.47 
2. Crimes against Humanity 
For an act to be considered as a crime against humanity, Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute states that it must have been committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack. Article 7(2)(a) defines "attack directed 
against any civilian population" as applied in Article 7(1) to mean a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to 
in paragraph one pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack. 
3. War Crimes 
Article 8 provides that the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war 
crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part 
of a large-scale commission of such crimes.48 With pressure from the 
U.S. and other permanent members of the Security Council, the 
Conference approved Article 124 under the Transitional Provision, 
which allows ratifying states to declare that they "opt out" of the Court's 
jurisdiction for war crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory 
for a non renewable period of seven years.49 
46. Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 25,1998, at Cl. 
47. Id. 
48. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art 8. 
49. Id., art 124. 
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C. TRIGGERING THE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
Article 12 provides that the court has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals 
suspected of committing any of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute 
when the crimes have been committed in the territory of state which has 
ratified the Rome Statute or when the crimes have been committed by a 
citizen of a state which has ratified the Rome Statute. Further, the Court 
may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of a non-
party state or crimes committed by a citizen of a non-party states if the 
state which has not ratified the Rome Statute makes a declaration 
accepting the court jurisdiction over the crime. The court may also 
exercise jurisdiction when the crimes have been committed in a situation 
which threatens or breaches international peace and security, and the UN 
Security Council has referred the situation to the Court pursuant to 
Chapter 7 of the UN Chapter. 
Article 13 provides three mechanisms to trigger the Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction for the crimes listed in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute. 
1. Referral by a State 
Under Article 13(a), a State party to the Court may refer a situation to the 
prosecutor in which one or more of the crimes covered by the statute 
appears to have been committed. The prosecutor is obliged to investigate 
such referrals for the purpose of determining whether one or more 
specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.50 
Under Article 12(3) a non party State in whose territory a crime subject 
to the jurisdiction of the court occurred, or of which the accused person 
is a national may, by declaration lodged with the registrar, accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in 
question. Thus, it follows that such a non party state may refer on ad hoc 
basis, a case to the prosecutor who shall in tum treat the referral in 
accordance with Article 14. 
2. Initiation by the Independent Prosecutor 
Article 15 allows the Court's Independent Prosecutor to initiate 
investigations proprio motu based on information from victims, non-
governmental organizations, or any other source. Despite the 
controversy surrounding this provision occasioned by the United States' 
objection, its advantage cannot be overemphasized because one cannot 
50. [d., art 13(a). 
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always rely on national governments and the Security Council to bring 
matters to the Court. 
In any event, the prosecutor's exercise of discretion is subject to the 
approval of the pretrial judges who determine whether there is a 
reasonable basis for the investigation.51 If the pre-trial judges are of the 
view that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, 
and that the case appears within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall 
authorize the prosecutor to proceed with investigation. On the other 
hand, if the pretrial judges are of the opinion that there is no sufficient 
basis to proceed with investigation, they shall decline authorization. The 
Prosecutor may subsequently represent the case based on new facts or 
evidence regarding the same situation.52 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council by resolution 
to stop a prosecution initiated by a state party, or stop the prosecutor 
from going forward, for an initial period of twelve months if in the 
opinion of the Security Council the prosecution will interfere with the 
Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security under 
Article VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council can renew its 
request indefinitely, In twelve month segments, under the same 
conditions. 
3. Referral by the Security Council 
In a situation in which one or more of the crimes covered under the ICC 
Statute appears to have been committed, the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may refer such matter to the 
prosecutor. Since the Security Council is exercising its power under 
Article VII of the UN Charter, it has been suggested that the ICC, acting 
under Security Council's direction, shall have jurisdiction over nationals 
of State parties and non-state parties without their consent. In other 
words, the UN Security Council may confer jurisdiction on the Court 
even when the alleged crimes occurred in the territory of a state which 
has not ratified the Rome Statute or the crime was committed by the 
national of such a state. Also, when the Security Council refers a matter 
to the ICC, it is expected that it will avail the court with its enforcement 
mechanism should a state fail to cooperate with the court.53 
51. /d., art. 15(2). 
52. [d., art. 15(5). 
53. Pejic, supra note 35, at 325. 
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ill. GROUNDS OF UNITED STATES' OBJECTIONS TO THE ICC 
A. ICC JURISDICTION OVER NON-PARTIES 
The main objection of the United States to the ICC Statute is based on a 
compromised Article 12 which set out the "preconditions" for the 
Court's jurisdiction in cases where the Security Council does not trigger 
the Court's jurisdiction. Absent submission of a case to the ICC by the 
UN Security Council, the Court can act only if the case occurs in the 
territory of a state party, or if the crime is committed by a citizen of a 
state party. 
Thus, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction over a citizen of a non-
party state if he or she commits a crime in the territory of a state party 
and the state party elects to surrender the accused to the jurisdiction of 
the Court rather than trying him or her in its national court. For this to 
occur, the accused must remain in the territory of a state party or be 
otherwise lawfully apprehended by the state party. This provision 
sharply limits the Court's jurisdiction absent Security Council initiative, 
as rogue nations will be the last to ratify the statute in order to shield 
them from the reach of the Court. 
Throughout the Conference, the U.S. sought to limit the Court's 
jurisdiction by arguing that the Court should exercise jurisdiction only 
against citizens of member states or territorial states on claims of official 
acts. The United States wanted a situation in which no U.S. citizen would 
ever be brought before the ICC without U.S. consent. 54 It demanded a 
guarantee that no U.S. servicemen or women would be investigated or 
prosecuted by the ICC without U.S. consent.55 
It has been suggested that the justification for the U.S. position was that 
"more than any other country the United States is expected to intervene 
to halt humanitarian catastrophes around the world."56 It was therefore 
argued that this position renders U.S. personnel "uniquely vulnerable to 
the potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court."57 The U.S. 
position was not acceptable to most countries at the Conference who 
54. Wedgwood et aI .• supra note 13. at 126. 
55. Id. 
56. Michael P. Scharf. Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Coun. 
ASIL INSIGHTS (June 1998). available at http://asil.orglinsightslinsigh20.htm (accessed Mar. 15. 
2002). 
57. Id. 
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voted to adopt Article 12.58 However in order to accommodate some of 
the concerns of the U.S., the states rejected the proposal by Korea that 
the Court should also exercise jurisdiction if the victim's state or the 
custodial state has ratified the statute.59 
It should be noted that in most cases, the state of nationality and the 
territorial state are likely to be the same, as occurred with Pol Pot of 
Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Pinochet of Chile.60 The inclusion of 
the custodial state would have made it possible to apprehend an accused 
while traveling outside his or her country, or in the alternative, make it 
difficult for the accused to travel outside his or her country, thereby 
denying a safe haven anywhere. But, given the way Article 12 was 
drafted, a country in whose territory an accused is residing will have no 
legal basis under the statute to surrender the accused to the Court. This 
is because Article 12 only requires a state party to submit to the Court's 
jurisdiction if the crime was committed on its territory, or the person 
accused of the crime is a national.61 In other words, a situation in which 
a person commits a crime in state A and then enters state B, state B is not 
obliged to surrender him or her to the Court because the crime was not 
committed in state B's territory and the accused is not a national of state 
B. 
Article 12 also makes it impossible for the victim's state to initiate a case 
to the ICC if its citizens were victims of international crimes in the 
territory of another state or by nationals of a non-state party. It has been 
suggested that if victim's state is allowed to submit a case to the Court, 
the Spanish government would have been in a position to petition the 
ICC (if it were then in existence) for the "disappearance" of some 
Spaniards in Argentina in the 1970s and 80S.62 
Notwithstanding the compromise to limit the court's jurisdiction only to 
situations in which the crime was committed in the territory of a state 
party or by a national of a state party, the U.S. representatives claimed 
that ICC jurisdiction overreaches, and violates fundamental principles of 
international law because it binds non-state parties.63 The U.S. argued 
that under customary international law, a treaty-based international court 
58. Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998 
available at http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2(02) [hereinafter 
ICC Treaty Text Analysis]. 
59. /d. 
60. /d. 
61. ICC Statute, supra note 3, arts. 12(2)(a-b). 
62. ICC Treaty Text Analysis, supra note 58. 
63. David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AlII.. 12, 18 
(1999). 
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cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party state when 
acting under the direction of such a non-party state.64 
According to Ambassador David Scheffer: 
The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for 
non-parties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, 
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that 
the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately 
seek from the United States and other military powers. There 
will be significant new legal and political risks in such 
interventions .... 65 
Another commentator has suggested that, by conferring upon the ICC 
jurisdiction over non-party nationals, the ICC Statute would abrogate the 
pre-existing rights of non-parties which, in tum, would violate the law of 
treaties. 66 This commentator suggested that a state has a right to be free 
from the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction over its nationals which 
cannot be abrogated by a treaty to which it is not a party.67 Cited in 
support were the ILC official Commentaries on the Vienna Convention 
to the effect that "[i]ntemational tribunals have been firm in laying down 
that in principle treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither impose 
obligations on States which are not parties nor modify in any way their 
legal rights without their consent."68 Furthermore, it was argued that 
because of the gravity of the outcome, member states cannot delegate to 
the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdiction.69 
Those who make the argument that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over individuals if his or her state has not ratified the statute confuse 
and/or equate the position of a non-party state with that of its nationals. 
As would be expected, this argument has been rejected by international 
law commentators on the simple basis that while a non-party state is not 
itself obligated under a treaty to which it has not consented, the same 
cannot be said of its nationals if they commit an offense in the territory 
of a state that is a party. 70 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides that "a treaty does not create either obligations 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 19. Ambassador Scheffer has since abandoned this position. See Scheffer, supra 
note 12, at 60. 
66. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26 (2001). 
67. Id. at 27. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Wedgwood et aI., supra note 13, at 127. 
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or rights for a third state without its consent."7) Also, Article 35 states 
that a treaty cannot establish an obligation on a non-party state unless it 
"expressly accepts that obligation in writing."72 
No provision of the Rome Statute expressly created obligations to non-
party states. It cannot therefore be argued that the Court's exercise of 
treaty-based jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party state for 
international crimes contravenes this rule of international law.73 
Therefore, the argument that the statute is "overreaching" because it 
purportedly obligates non-party states through the exercise of jurisdiction 
over their nationals is a gross distortion of customary internationallaw.74 
In addition, the U.S. is a party to many treaties that are globally binding 
on nationals of party and non-party states because they reflect the 
common interests of humanity.75 Similarly, U.S. legislative practice 
recognizes that the first and best established jurisdictional principle is 
"territoriality." Territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality 
the exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.76 Also, U.S. 
legislative practice recognizes that a state may exercise universal 
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses of universal concern 
which are recognized by the community of nations, such as piracy, the 
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of an aircraft, genocide, war crimes, 
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1969). 
72. ld., art. 35. 
73. Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of 
Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L.R. 363, 376 (2001). 
74. See Human rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments, 
available at http://www.hrw.orglhrw/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 
2(02). 
75. See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done 
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 ("Hague Convention"); Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 565 ("Montreal 
Convention"); The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done Dec. 17, 1979, 
1979 V.S.T. LEXIS 186; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T. 
1975 ("Protected Persons Convention"); The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 202 (''Torture 
Convention"); The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 V.N.T.S. 243 ("Apartheid Convention"); The 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material done Oct. 26, 1979, 1979 U.S.T. LIDOS 
187. These treaties provide for and obligate states, both states of nationality and territorial states, to 
exercise jurisdiction or extradite. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention, the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Protected Persons Convention, the Torture 
Convention and the Apartheid Convention allow for the victim's state to either exercise jurisdiction 
or extradite. The U.S. is a member of all except the Apartheid Convention. 
76. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, § 402 cmt. (American Law 
Institute, 1987). 
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and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction 
indicated in section 402 are present.77 
United States courts have given judicial support to these statutory 
provisions, recognizing national courts' power to exercise jurisdiction in 
circumstances identical to those set forth in the provisions of Article 12 
of the ICC Statute.78 Therefore, it is preposterous for the U.S. to argue 
77. [d. 'll 404. 
78. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that instruments not binding upon states as a treaty, "create an expectation of adherence, 
and insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice ... may by custom become 
recognized as laying down rules binding upon states"; Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 
I.L.R. 50 (Israel S.C!. 1962) where the Israeli Supreme Court found that there was "full justification 
for applying here the principle of universal jurisdiction since the international character of "crimes 
against humanity" ... dealt with in this instant case is no longer in doubt ... " acts alleged happened 
before the existence of the state of Israel; In re Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affd, 
776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) the court allowed the extradition to Israel of a German concentration 
camp guard. The Court invoked universal jurisdiction, noting: "international law does not generally 
prohibit the application of national laws over non citizens for acts committed outside its territory". 
The Court noted that "Israel has brought charges ... asserting jurisdiction based on a statute that 
penalizes "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" among other acts. The international 
community has determined that these offenses are crimes over which universal jurisdiction exists." 
The Court quoted with approval the case of United States v. Otto, Case No. OOO-Mauthausen-5 
(DJAWC, July 10, 1947), to the effect that "international law provides that certain offenses may be 
prosecuted by any state because the offenders are common enemies of all mankind and all nations 
have an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment"; Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. T., 83 
AM. I. INT'L L. 334,341 (1999) noting a Denmark court trial of defendant in 1994 for war crimes 
committed against Bosnians in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 
232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) where a U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on universal 
jurisdiction to assert jurisdiction in a tort case arising under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act against Radovan Karazic, the Bosnian Serb leader accused of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes in Bosnia; United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. Cir. 
1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (C.A.D.C. 1991) - treaty-based jurisdiction over offenders found in their 
territory, the court upheld the U.S. court's subject matter jurisdiction, based on the Hague 
Convention and the Taking of Hostages Convention, that the victim's state of nationality may 
exercise jurisdiction holding this to be consistent with customary international law, even when the 
perpetrator was lured or brought into the territory of a State party. The U.S. exercised jurisdiction as 
the state of nationality of two U.S. passengers who were among the victims of the alleged crime; 
United States v. Layton, 519 F.Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988). The 
U.S. exercised jurisdiction on the basis of being the state of the victim's nationality. This case 
involved the murder of a U.S. congressman by a Guyanan citizen in Guyana - Internationally 
Pmtected Persons Convention; U.S. v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), where jurisdiction 
was based on the Montreal Convention to try the defendants with various charges in connection with 
alleged conspiracy to bomb United States commercial airliners operating overseas and roles in the 
bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 
1998), the U.S. apprehended and prosecuted a Palestinian national for hijacking an Egyptian airliner, 
despite the fact that Palestine is not a party to the Hague Hijacking Convention; United States v. 
Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79,82 (2d. Cir. 1998) for attempted abduction of Chang Fung Chung on 
April 24, 1992; United States v. Chen De Yian, 905 F.Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. 
Chen De Yian, 1995 WL 614563 (S.D.N.Y.) - indictment alleging defendants and others conspired 
to take Chan Fung Chung hostage in order to compel Chung's relatives to pay ransom to obtain 
release from 1991 on or about April 24, 1992); United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 368 
(5th Cir. 1999), charging that accused "knowingly and intentionally seize, detain, threaten to injure 
and continue to detain Jocelyn Tehya Garrido in order to compel Ricardo Garrido and Maria Elliott 
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that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction against nationals of non-party 
states is overreaching, or that it is a violation of fundamental principles 
of international law. 
It should be noted that U.S. is not opposed to the Court's subject matter 
jurisdiction, i.e. genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 79 
Presently, any individual state may try perpetrators of these crimes under 
the universal or territorial jurisdiction principle.so That state would not 
need consent from another nation.81 Thus, if individual states can 
exercise universal jurisdiction over the same crimes contained in the ICC 
Statute, there has not been any convincing legal argument to deny a 
group of states joining together to set up a court that does the same thing. 
Indeed, the Nuremberg tribunal set the precedent for this situation when 
it stated: "[the Allied Powers] have done together what anyone of them 
might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the 
right thus to set up special courts to administer law."82 
The reality is that the Rome Statute cut down on the ability of the Court 
to exercise universal jurisdiction through the principle of 
complementarity. Also, absent U.N. Security Council action, the court 
must obtain the consent of either the state on whose territory a crime is 
committed or the state of nationality of the accused.83 Furthermore, the 
UN Security Council has authority to halt prosecutions if in its opinion 
such prosecution will not be compatible with its responsibilities under 
Article VII of the UN Charter. 84 Therefore, the flawed argument by the 
United States that the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over nationals 
of non-state parties is only an excuse to keep its nationals insulated from 
the Court. 
B. POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PROSECUTION 
Another of the U.S.'s grounds for opposing the ICC is that it could be 
used by its enemies to initiate politically motivated prosecutions against 
U.S. nationals. Article 15 of the ICC allows the ICC prosecutor to 
Garrido to pay a cash ransom for therelease of Jocelyn Tehya Garrido, in violation of 18 U.S.c. §§ 
2, 1203 (2002). 
79. Scheffer, supra note 63, at 12-13. 
80. Paul Amell, International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, II INT'L LEGAL 
PERSP. 53, 60-63 (1999). Also see Attorney-General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 26 
(Israel S.C!. 1962). 
81. Id. Also see, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-583 (6'" Cir. 1985). 
82. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 
annex, 59 Stat. 1544,82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (Supp. 1945). 
83. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 12. 
84. Id., art. 16. 
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undertake investigations on his or her own initiative.85 The U.S. was 
concerned that the Office of the Independent Prosecutor might be used to 
bring politically motivated prosecutions against U.S. soldiers.86 
It would appear that the U.S.'s objection to an independent Prosecutor 
stems from its experience with the virtually unlimited investigative and 
prosecutorial powers of the Office of U.S. Independent Prosecutor as 
orchestrated by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr during the Clinton 
AdministrationY It was suggested by one anonymous U.S. official that 
the United States feared that an independent ICC Prosecutor "would turn 
out to be an 'international Ken Starr. "'88 As a result of the wide 
discretionary powers of the U.S. independent prosecutor, there is now an 
attempt in the United States to allow the independent counsel law to 
lapse.89 However, in the case of the ICC, this fear is unfounded because 
of the various provisions in the statute to check the exercise of the 
powers of the ICC Independent Prosecutor. These checks are discussed 
below. 
1. Pre-Trial Panel 
Article 15 of the statute provides that the prosecutor will exercise his/her 
discretion subject to the supervision and approval of a three member pre-
trial panel of eminently qualified judges.90 The judges will determine 
whether there is a reasonable basis for the investigations.91 The decision 
of the pre-trial panel is subject to appeal.92 
Even if it is admitted that the prosecutor's job will be influenced by 
political considerations, the prosecutor's discretion must be guided by 
the statute. Thus, even where the prosecutor concludes there is not 
sufficient evidence to proceed, the pre-trial panel can review that 
decision on request or on its own initiative.93 Thus, in every situation, 
the prosecutor is required to establish whether the ICC has jurisdiction in 
85. Id., art 15. 
86. Scheffer, supra note 63, at 19. 
87. Scott Andreasen, Note, The International Criminal Coun: Does the Constitution Preclude 
Its Ratification by the United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 697, 723 (2000). 
88. Id., at n.198. 
89. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (2002). 
90. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 36(5). Also see, David Scheffer, U.N. International 
Criminal Court, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate (July 23, 
1998) available at 1998 WL 12762512 [hereinafter David Scheffer Testimony]. David Scheffer, 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic 
Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, cited the "rigorous 
qualifications for judges" as one of the U.S. objectives achieved at the Conference. 
91. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(4). 
92. Id., art 18(4). 
93. Id., art. 53(3) (a) (b). 
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the case; whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction; and the 
merit of the case.94 Therefore, these legal hurdles will make it difficult 
for political consideration to overshadow the prosecutor's decision on 
which case to prosecute, and make it a priority on hislher part to 
prosecute the most serious crimes. 
2. Security Council Intervention 
Under Article 16 of the ICC Statute, the U.N. Security Council may by 
unanimous vote delay a prosecution for twelve months if it believes the 
ICC would interfere with the Council's efforts to further international 
peace and security. Article 16 further allows the UN Security Council to 
renew the request on the same grounds. In other words, the UN Security 
Council may perpetually intervene to suspend a case before the ICC at 
every twelve month interval on same grounds because Article 16 does 
not limit the number of times the UN Security Council may request the 
suspension of a case for security reasons.95 This provision was a result of 
a compromise suggestion by Singapore to placate the U.S.96 As one of 
the permanent members of the Security Council, it is plausible to suggest 
that the United States stands in a better position to use this provision to 
perpetually forestall the prosecution of a case concerning its nationals. 
3. The Principle of Complementarity 
The principle of complementarity which permeates the ICC Statute 
confers primacy on domestic courts over the ICC. In other words, the 
Court's jurisdiction is complementary to domestic courts, and it can 
exercise jurisdiction only when national criminal courts are not available 
or are unable to perform.97 National sovereignty concerns informed the 
introduction of the principle of complementarity in the operation of the 
ICC. 98 Article 17 provides that the ICC will defer its jurisdiction to a 
national court except in situations where national courts have been 
genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute the 
accused.99 Article 17 is applicable even when the state's leaders are 
94. Id., art 53. 
95. Id., art 16. 
96. John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrivers -- The U.S. Position: Status and 
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 873, 878 (2002) citing Lionel Vee, The International Criminal 
Court and the Security Council, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE 143 (RoyS. Leeed., 1999). 
97. ICC Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., '1110. 
98. Article I of the Statute provides that the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for 
the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. 
99. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(a). 
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themselves implicated. loo The prosecutor is duty-bound to notify all 
states that might normally exercise jurisdiction of his or her intention to 
continue with an investigation. 101 Thereupon, any state, whether a state 
party or not, may then inform the Court that it is investigating the 
situation domestically. 102 In such an event, the prosecutor must defer to 
that investigation.103 
However, the pre-trial chamber can authorize an investigation by the 
prosecutor if it determines that the state is unable or unwilling to 
adequately carry out an effective investigation. I04 Such finding is subject 
to challenge by the state.105 The statute places the onus on the ICC 
prosecutor to prove that a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute, or 
that investigations and trials carried out by a state are fraudulent. 106 
It has been suggested that a state may be unable to prosecute if it lacks 
the required manpower and institutions to carry out a meaningful 
criminal prosecution. I07 Such a situation could have arisen after the 
genocide in Rwanda, where very few lawyers and judges survived the 
1994 massacre. 108 On the other hand, a state may be unwilling to 
prosecute a perpetrator if it demonstrates that it lacks the political will to 
do so. This may occur where the accused is a member of the state 
government, or exerts influence over or accepts favors from those in 
government. 
Article 17 was ostensibly drafted to accommodate and protect the United 
States' interest. 109 Under the complementarity provision, the United 
States may actually prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over its 
citizens by informing the Court of its willingness to investigate the 
100. Id., art. 28. 
101. Id., art. 18(1). 
102. Id., art 18(2) provides that within one month of receipt of notification, a state may inform 
the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with 
respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes referred to in Article 5 and which relate to the 
information provided in the notification to States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall 
defer to the State's investigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of 
the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation. 
103. Id. 
104. Id., art 19. 
105. Id., art 18(4). The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber 
against a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance to Article 82. Such appeal may be heard on 
an expedited basis. 
106. Id., art. 17(2)(3). 
107. David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Court: Arbour says Rules Shield 
World's Worst Criminals, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 (quoting Justice Louise 
Arbour of the Supreme Court of Canada and former ICTY IICTR prosecutor). 
108. Id. 
109. Scheffer, supra note 12, at 59-60. 
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allegation under Article 18(2).110 In the event that the pre-trial chamber 
rejects such request, Article 18(4) allows the requesting state to appeal an 
adverse ruling of the pre-trial chamber to the appeals chamber. I II In 
addition, under Article 18(7) a state which has challenged a ruling of the 
pre-trial chamber may challenge the admissibility of the case under 
Article 19 on grounds of additional significant facts or significant change 
of circumstances. I 12 With these arrangements, the possibility that the 
United States or any state party to the Rome Statute would not maintain 
control over a case involving its citizen is exceedingly remote. I 13 
In view of this possibility, cntlcs have suggested that the 
complementarity provisions have watered down the jurisdiction of the 
court, and worry that a state party may use the complementary provisions 
to shield its nationals from the court's jurisdiction. 114 At a press 
conference on June 12, 2001 then U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen, while opposing the ICC, admitted that the Court's limited 
authority would protect U.S. troops and officials. lIS He said that the U.S. 
has "demonstrated over the years wherever there is an allegation of abuse 
on the part ofa soldier we have a judicial system that will deal with it 
very effectively."116 He correctly asserted that "as long as we have a 
respected judicial system then there should be some insulation factor."117 
Thus, this fact has not been lost on the U.S. government. 
The United States has court-martialed its own soldiers in the past for 
criminal activities, and there is no reason to believe it would not continue 
to do so. Also, the United States' judicial system is well advanced and 
can try almost all war crimes committed by U.S. nationals. In deserving 
circumstances, the United States has enacted law requiring courts to hear 
cases of nationals who have allegedly violated the law of nations as 
contained in the ICC Statute. It is inconceivable that the U.S. will refuse 
to try or at least investigate a U.S. solider accused of indictable war 
110. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art 18(2). 
111. /d., art 18(4). 
112. Id., art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17 
or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a 
case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted 
the case. 
113. Id. 
114. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an 
International Criminal Coun: Is the Coun's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National 
Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I (2002). 
liS. See Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers About the ICC, at 
www.hrw.orglcampaigns/icc/qna.htm(last visited on Feb. 17,2003). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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crimes. Failure to do so would reflect adversely upon the credibility of 
U.S. leadership, thus making it unlikely that it would take such a step. 
With such an advanced judicial system and history of criminal 
prosecution, it is difficult to imagine a situation where an investigation or 
prosecution carried out by the U.S. will be' considered fraudulent. 
Therefore, if the U.S. exercises jurisdiction over its nationals, the ICC 
will be estopped from prosecuting its nationals under the principle of 
complementarity. liS Thus, the international legal community is puzzled 
over the U.S.' opposition to the ICC because of possible politically 
motivated prosecution. 
On the contrary, developing countries are less likely to benefit from the 
complementarity provision as their legal systems and political climate 
will be more unable or unwilling to undertake satisfactory and successful 
prosecutions. As has been observed by Justice Arbour, "states with 
relatively developed legal systems will have a 'major trump card' to 
evade justice and will clash with developing countries that don't."119 She 
posits that such a clash will be intensely political so that the ICC risks 
becoming the true default jurisdiction for developing countries, 
subjecting the court to major political legal battles with everyone else. 120 
Therefore, developing countries should be the ones complaining of 
politically motivated prosecution, not advanced democracies like the 
U.S., whose legal system would easily satisfy the precondition for 
exercising jurisdictional primacy as provided under the complementarity 
principle. 
However, an assessment that a government is unwilling to prosecute 
should not be based on lack of action in a single case, but on a systematic 
pattern of judicial inaction in pertinent cases. 121 Where a judicial system 
is considered unable to conduct trials, the ICC should not concern itself 
with assuming jurisdiction; rather the international community should 
offer assistance and training to overcome any shortcomings. 122 In this 
way, the ICC would retain the integrity of governments' judicial systems. 
This is necessary, considering the fact that governments constitute the 
118. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(3). 
119. Rider, supra note 107. 
120. Id. 
121. See Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International 
Criminal Coun (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at http://www.wiltonpark.org.uklweb/welcome.html (last 
visited Feb. 17,2003). 
122. Id. 
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Court's national partners, and their cooperation and compliance are 
integral to its functioning. 123 
4. Nature of CrimelMental Element 
The nature of the crimes for which the court will exercise jurisdiction 
must be of such degree that they shock the conscience of nations. Thus, 
the court will only exercise jurisdiction over horrific crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The evidentiary threshold of 
establishing these crimes is enormous and the onus is on the independent 
prosecutor to establish that the accused has committed crimes in the 
degree provided in the statute. 
a. Genocide 
For the crime of genocide, Article 5 of the Rome Statute adopted from 
the 1948 Geneva Conventionl24 provides that the accused must have 
committed the crime with "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, through killing 
members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another groUp."125 
b. Crimes Against Humanity 
Article 7, which creates crimes against humanity, is a multilateral 
codification of the Nuremberg Charter.126 It is not, however, as broad as 
customary international law because it limits the court's jurisdiction only 
to the most serious crimes of international concern such as murder, 
exterinination, and enslavement in peacetime or during war.127 Also 
listed are crimes of sexual assault such as "rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity."128 To be found guilty of 
crimes against humanity, the statute requires that the accused commit 
any of the listed acts "as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
123. Id. 
124. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78 
V.N.T.S. 277, 280. The Vnited States is a party to this statute. 
125. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 6. 
126. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 9. 
127. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 7. 
128. Id., art. 7(1)(g). 
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directed against any civilian population" and "pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a state or organizational policy."129 
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, \30 the tribunal defined widespread as "massive, 
frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable 
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims."'31 Systematic 
was defined as "thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on 
the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private 
resources. "132 
Therefore, for a U.S. service member to be found guilty of crimes against 
humanity, the accused must have carried out any of the listed crimes 
repeatedly against civilians and on the basis of a common public or 
private organizational policy. It is hard to imagine a situation where the 
U.S. would authorize and/or allow a U.S. service man or woman to 
engage in any of the acts listed in Article 7 and in such magnitude as is 
required to bring the act within the jurisdiction of the ICC. In other 
words, isolated attacks carried out by a trigger-happy service member 
without superior directive will not suffice. Thus, the U.S. concern for 
politically motivated prosecution of its service members is difficult to 
rationalize. 
c. War Crimes 
Article 8, which provides for grave breaches of war crimes committed in 
both international and internal armed conflicts, incorporates (with 
narrower definitions and an exhaustive list) the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, as well as, conventional and customary laws of war.\33 The 
Court's jurisdiction attaches for war crimes in international armed 
conflict only when "in particular" those crimes are "part of a plan or 
policy or part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."I34 On the 
other hand, for internal armed conflict, \35 the Court will exercise 
jurisdiction only when "there is protracted armed conflict between 
129. Id. 
130. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgments Int'l Criminal Trib. Rwanda 
Trial Chamber I, at 1580 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(3). 
133. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2). 
134. Id., art. 8(1). 
135. Internal armed conflict includes organized armed opposition, or "freedom fighters," 
engaged in armed struggle within the territory of the state for either control of the government or 
self-governance. 
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governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groupS."136 
United States nationals are unlikely to engage in internal armed conflict. 
With regard to international armed conflict, Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, Chair 
of the Drafting Committee at the ICC Conference, noted that a situation 
in which war crimes charges were brought against U.S. military 
personnel on peacekeeping missions would not hold up because the 
statute defines war crimes as primarily acts committed "as part of a plan 
or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes."137 
Therefore, he argued that "the trigger-happy Marine wouldn't fall under 
that." I 38 Thus, a politically motivated prosecution of U.S. service 
personnel would be difficult, if not impossible. 
Even at that, Article 124 of the Rome Statute allows a state party to opt 
out of the Court's jurisdiction for seven years after becoming a party to 
the ICC Statute over war crimes committed on its territory or by its 
nationals in internal armed conflict. \39 Article 124 was inserted in the 
statute to accommodate the U.S.'s interest. The United States' 
representatives to the Rome Conference had sought a ten years "opt out" 
from the court's jurisdiction over war crimes, but the conference agreed 
only to a seven year opt-out period for war crimes. l40 Article 124 
provides a compromise capable of "undermining the status of war crimes 
as truly universal crimes [that might] result in a court with a fragmented 
jurisdiction."'41 It has therefore been criticized as creating a loophole to 
evade justice which is legally and morally unjustifiable. '42 The "opt out" 
clause is an unwarranted restriction on the court's jurisdiction which will 
severely hamper its effectiveness for years, if not decades."'43 
These checks notwithstanding, the American government insisted that 
the Rome statute must contain an ironclad guarantee that no American 
would ever come before the Court.l44 Apart from the apparent inequality 
of this request, its obvious implication is that a guarantee for America 
136. ld. 
137. See James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA JOURNAL 68 (Sept. 1998). 
138. ld. 
139. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 124. Article 124 provides that a state party to the ICC may 
elect to exempt its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court for a non-renewable period of seven 
years from the date of ratification of the statute for war crimes. 
140. See David Scheffer Testimony, supra note 90. 
141. Stanley, supra note 45. 
142. Kirsch, supra note 41, at 10. 
143. Je1ena Pejic, Senior Program coordinator at the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in 
New York City, cited in Podgers, supra note 137, at 68. 
144. See Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. Objects to a World 
Criminal Court, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at COl. 
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would mean a de jure and de facto exemption of all other countries 
which would effectively render the purpose of the Court moribund. 
C. INCLUSION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
The United States opposes the inclusion of the crime of aggression under 
the court's jurisdiction. It insists on an affirmative determination by the 
Security Council prior to bringing a complaint for aggression before the 
Court. 145 The statute, however, provides that the Court cannot exercise 
jurisdiction until the statute is amended to define aggression and 
establish the conditions. l46 Such amendment "shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."147 Article 5(2) 
of the Statute is intended to ensure that the Statute's definition of 
aggression does not depart from Security Council duties under Article 
VII of the UN Charter. The United States' objection to the inclusion of 
the crime of aggression within the Court's jurisdiction is therefore 
premature. A consensus on the definition of the meaning of aggression 
is required, and may never happen in the near future. 148 
D. ABSENCE OF THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
Although the ICC statutory provisions for the protection of the right of 
an accused very much duplicates the traditional constitutional protections 
in the U.S. Bill of Rights, some have argued that the absence of the right 
to jury trial is fatal to U.S. ratification of the ICC Statute.149 The United 
States argues that the ICC procedure does not include the right to speedy 
trial and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 150 This 
argument is hardly correct, as the ICC contains adequate protections of 
an accused's right to speedy trial and to cross-examine witnesses as 
provided in Articles 59, 60, and 67. 151 
Article 66( 1) of the statute contains the principle that all accused persons 
shall be presumed innocent until proven gUilty before the ICC. Article 
66(2) clearly provides that the prosecution bears the burden of proof 
145. David Scheffer Testimony, supra note 90. 
146. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 5(1 led). 
147. Id., art. 5(2). 
14S. The cold war era and the debate whether actions by non-state organs only may qualify as 
aggression were some of the issues that had militated against an acceptable definition of aggression. 
Some states oppose the inclusion of state action in the definition of aggression. 
149. John Seguin, Note, Denouncing the International Criminal Coun: An Examination of u.s. 
Objections to the Rome Statute, IS B.U. JNT'L LJ. S5, 107-OS (2000) quoting David Scheffer 
Testimony, supra note 140. 
150. Id. See also, Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. S09, 812 (2000). 
151. ICC Statute, supra note 3. 
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throughout the trial. To discharge this burden, Article 66(3) states that in 
order to convict, the ICC must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused is gUilty. Article 67(i) provides that the accused must 
not bear "any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal," 
and Article 67(1)(g) expressly states that an accused has the right to 
remain silent at trial without silence being a consideration in the 
determination of guilt or innocence. Thus, the fundamental tenets of a 
fair trial in any civilized state are adequately provided for in the statute. 152 
It must be noted that the purpose of a jury system in the American justice 
system is to ensure a fair trial. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 
Palko V. Connecticut'53 that while the right to trial by jury is important, it 
is "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'54 The Court 
opined that to abolish it is not to violate a "principle of justice so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental."'55 It is submitted that the ICC Statute contains sufficient 
provisions that guarantee a fair trial to the accused. Therefore, the U.S. 
should not be fixated on the requirement of a jury trial, but must be 
amenable to any arrangement that contain substantial guarantee of 
fairness to the accused. '56 
Furthermore, the United States has allowed American citizens to be tried 
abroad without a guarantee of American constitutional protections, or 
152. Human Rights Watch, lists the following rights, contained in the Rome Statute, as relevant 
to guarantee a fair trial and treatment of an accused: 
Rights not to incriminate oneself, not to be subject to any form of coercion, to 
an interpreter, not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention, to be informed 
of the grounds to believe he or she committed a crime, to remain silent, with-
out silence being a consideration in guilt or innocence, to legal assistance, to 
have counsel present during questioning, to be heard before charges are con-
firmed, to be informed of the evidence on which the prosecutor intends to rely 
at the confirination hearing, to be present at triaL Similarly, defendants have 
their fundamental rights guaranteed, including the right to be informed 
promptly and in detail of the charges, to have full time and facilities for the 
preparation of one's defense and free communication with counsel, to trial 
without delay, to cross examine witnesses and obtain attendance of witnesses, 
not to incriminate oneself, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, to have evidence disclosed which shows or mitigates the 
guilt of the accused or affects the credibility of prosecution evidence. See 
Myths and Facts· About the International Criminal Court, at 
www.hrw.orglcampaignslicc/facts.htm (last visited Feb. 18,-2003). 
153. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
154. /d. at 325. 
155. Id. 
156. For further discussions see, Diane Holcombe, The United States Becomes a Signatory to 
the Rome Treaty Establishing the International Criminal Court: Why Are So Many Concerned By 
This Action, 62 MONT. L. REV. 301,329-335 (2001). 
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specifically, a jury trial. J57 "In other words, merely because an offense 
occurred in the United States involving an American national, extradition 
of that individual does not violate the United States Constitution."158 This 
is usually the case when the U.S. accedes to extradition requests from 
countries that have bilateral extradition treaties with the U.S. In Neely v. 
Henkel,159 Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court opined that: 
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign 
country, he cannot complain if required to submit to 
such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws 
of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless 
a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations 
between that country and the United States.l60 
However, those who object to United States ratification of the ICC 
Statute have argued that Neely applies only in situations where the 
crimes were either committed abroad, or were intended to achieve 
criminal consequences abroad.161 Even accepting this construction of the 
Neely decision, it should be pointed out that so far the U.S. has indicated 
concern over the trial of its servicemen for crimes committed while on 
peacekeeping operations abroad. Therefore, the war crimes would have 
been committed by Americans in a foreign territory which would have 
effect in a foreign country, thereby making the decision in Neely 
applicable. 
In addition, it must be recalled that in United States v. Melia,162 the court 
upheld extradition of a U.S. citizen to Canada for conspiring by 
telephone from Connecticut with persons in Canada to commit a murder 
in the United States.163 Also, in Austin v. Healy,l64 the Court upheld 
extradition of U.S. citizen to the U.K. for conspiring from New York to 
arrange a murder in the D.K.165 Similarly, in Valencia v. Scott,166 the 
157. Id. at 335 (citing Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) (accused extradited 
for crimes committed in U.S. with intended criminal effects in another country)). In United States v. 
Melia, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although the accused never entered Canada to 
conspire or commit the murder, his telephone calls to Canada were enough to allow his extradition to 
Canada to stand trial. 
158. Holcombe, supra note 156, at 335. 
159. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). 
160. Id. 
161. Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of 
Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the 
International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFr. 391,419 (2002). 
162. Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). 
163. Id. 
164. Austin v. Healy, 5 F.3d 598 (2d cir. 1993). 
165. Id. 
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court upheld extradition of U.S. citizens to France for conspiracy to 
export cocaine from New York to France. 167 Therefore, trying U.S. 
nationals before the ICC without the participation of a jury would be 
neither unique nor unconstitutional. 
IV. AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TAKEN BY THE U.S. TO UNDERMINE 
THE ICC 
Since the ICC Statute took effect, the United States has taken several 
steps to continue its opposition to the court and to try to prevent the court 
from exercising jurisdiction over U.S. nationals. Some of these steps are 
discussed below. 
A. UN-SIGNING OF THE STATUTE 
On May 6, 2002, the Bush administration formally notified the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that the United States would not 
become a party to the International Criminal Court statute. 168 By virtue 
of section 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,169 the 
effect of this unusual act is that the U.S. government, having made clear 
its intention not to become a party to the ICC Statute, is relieved of its 
obligations as a signatory state to the ICC to refrain from acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose of the ICC Statute. 170 Beyond this, 
however, the United States' signature will remain on the original of the 
statute in the custody of the Secretary-General, and it could still be 
followed by U.S. ratification of the ICC Statute anytime the U.S. is 
predisposed to become a state party.I71 
B. AMERICAN SERVICE-MEMBERS' PROTECTION ACT OF 2002 
In December 2001, Congress passed the American Service-members' 
Protection Act (ASPA) which in part bans the U.S. from cooperating 
with the court in any way, and permits the president to use "all means 
necessary" to free American citizens if they are detained for or on behalf 
166. Galen Valencia V. Scott, 1992 WL 75036 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
167. Id. 
168. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at n.6. 
169. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1969). Article 18 provides that "a State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed 
the treaty [ ... ) until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party thereto." 
170. See Jacques Roman, Treaty Signatures Can't be Withdrawn, BANGKOK POST, May 11, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 18165663. See, however, ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 127, which 
provides that withdrawal will take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless 
notification specifies a later date. 
171. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 126(2). 
30
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol9/iss1/3
2003] u.s. OBJECTION TO THE ICC 49 
of the court and to block extradition of U.S. nationals accused of war 
crimes to the court. 172 
However, before Congress went on its 2001 annual recess, it decided not 
to submit the ASPA for the president's signature, but the Defense 
Appropriations bill adopted by Congress for the Fiscal Year 2002 
contains a provision adopted by the House which prohibits the use of 
FY2002 funds to cooperate with the Court. 173 This provision was offered 
by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde (R-
ll).174 A similar amendment offered by Senator Larry Craig (R-Id) 
applying to the FY2002 budgets for the State, Commerce, and Justice 
Departments, was approved by Congress in November and has been 
signed into law by President Bush. '75 
The effects of these bills were merely symbolic, as there was little 
likelihood that any country would be called upon to make financial 
contributions to the Court during the fiscal year covered by the bills. 
However, the actions taken by the United States Congress and President 
Bush is significant because it clearly sent the message that the Bush 
administration does not intend to support the ICC. 
The final version of the ASP A was signed into law on August 03, 2002, 
by President Bush. 176 The ASPA authorizes the president "to use all 
means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release" of any 
American or citizen of a United States ally being held by the ICC and to 
provide legal assistance for such persons. 177 The ASPA also provides for 
the withdrawal of U.S. military assistance from countries ratifying the 
ICC, and allows for U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions to 
be contingent upon immunity.178 
The President may, however, waive this provision on "national interest" 
grounds. 179 In essence, the Act gives the administration discretion to 
override the ASPA's effects on a case-by-case basis. But, as Richard 
Dicker observed, the U.S. government "may try to use this to strong-arm 
172. See Conferees Drop ASPA from FY2002 Defense Appropriations Bill; Retain Hyde 
Provision Precluding Assistance to ICC (Jan. 9, 2002) at www.unausa.orglnewindex.asp. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. Dicker, supra note 19. 
177. American Service-members' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7432 (2002) 
[hereinafter ASPAj. 
178. [d., §§ 2005, 2007. 
179. [d., § 2003. 
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additional concessions from the states that support the court."180 Dicker 
therefore urged states supporting the ICC "not to fall into the U.S. trap," 
noting that ASPA does not require any punitive measures: 81 
C. BILATERAL ICC IMMUNITY DEALS 
In July 2002, the Bush administration sought permanent immunity from 
the court, but obtained a one-year deferral from the Security Council of 
ICC's jurisdiction over U.S. service members on peacekeeping 
operations: 82 Although the UN Security Council granted the U.S. only 
one year, it is likely that the one-year deferral will be renewed again.183 
The Security Council should, however, be mindful of creating a 
precedent that may be latched onto by other states to demand similar 
exemptions in the future. 
After obtaining a one-year deferral, the U.S. is now trying, on a country-
by-country basis, to get countries (especially those that have American 
troops stationed in their territory) to sign bilateral ICC immunity deals, 
arguably under Article 98 of the ICC Statute. U.S. State Department 
officials confirm that the Bush administration has asked U.S. embassies 
around the world to approach host governments about negotiating such 
bilateral agreements with the U.S:84 Yugoslavia and Norway 
government officials have confirmed that their governments have been 
approached by the U.S. to sign an ICC immunity agreements. 185 
The ICC immunity agreement is an undertaking by both countries not to 
extradite each other's citizens to the International Criminal Court without 
mutual consent. The Bush administration has threatened ICC state 
parties with withdrawal of military aid, including education, training, and 
financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry, if they fail to 
protect Americans serving in their countries from ICC reach. 186 
180. Dicker, supra note 19. 
181. Id. 
182. S.c. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 45720d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES11422 (2002), available at 
http://www.un.org!Docs/Scres/2002Jsc2002.htm. 
183. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 16, allows the Security Council to defer an investigation or 
prosecution by the Courts for periods of one year, renewable annually, if the Council decides that 
such deferral is in the interest of international peace and security. 
184. U.S. Dept. of State Daily Press Briefing, Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman (Aug. 8, 
2002) available at http://www.diplomacy.orglartOO20.html. 
185. U.S. Asks Yugoslavia to Sign Non-Extradition Pact for ICC Court Cases, Assoc. PREss 
WORLDSTREAM, Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.iccnow.orglhtmllpressart98db20020924.pdf 
(on file with author). See also, USA Asks Norway to Sign Non-Extradition Pact on Hague Court, 
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 8,2002, (Int'I News), available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. 
186. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
2002, at AI. 
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Since July 2002, when the ICC Statute came into effect, the United 
States has signed immunity deals with 18 countries, including, 
Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, EI Salvador, 
Gambia, Honduras, India, Israel, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, 
Micronesia, Nepal, Palau, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. 187 Although the European Union had initially resisted the 
United States' request for a so-called Article 98 bilateral agreement,188 
the 15 member EU governments agreed to prevent the extradition of 
American government employees accused of war crimes to the Court. 189 
The only' condition is that the United States government guarantees that 
such a suspect would be tried in an American court. The immediate 
effect of this decision is that any European Union nation is now free to 
sign a separate bilateral agreement with the United States over the 
Court. 190 
The conclusion of a bilateral agreement between ICC state parties and 
the United States is objectionable, as it contradicts the customary 
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which obligates a 
state party not to do anything that will undermine its treaty obligations.191 
State parties to the ICC agreed in Article 88 to "ensure that there are 
procedures available under their national law for all forms of 
cooperation" listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. In addition, Article 
59(1) requires state parties to comply immediately with requests by the 
ICC to arrest and surrender accused persons in their territories. 
State parties to the ICC have an affirmative duty to assist in locating and 
extraditing an accused within its territories. Therefore, these state parties 
should be concluding agreements that will expedite this obligation under 
Article 59(1) of the Rome Statute. However, the essence of a bilateral 
treaty with the United States is to insulate U.S. nationals from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, which will directly affect the ability of the Court 
to prosecute those accused of committing international crimes. The ICC 
was created to ensure that anyone, no matter what his or her position, 
who commits an international crime is held accountable for his or her 
actions. The existence of bilateral immunity deals excluding citizens of 
187. U.S. Seals 18th ICC Immunity Deal as Djibouti Agrees to Pact, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 
24,2003, (General News), available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. 
188. EU Concerned Over Romanian Deal With United States on Immunity From International 
Criminal Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Aug. 8, 2002, available at 
http://www.derechos.orgjnizkor/icdeuromania.html. 
189. Paul Meller, Europeans to Exempt U.S. From War Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2002, at A6. 
190. Id. 
191. Among the states that have signed bilateral agreements with the United States. 
Afghanistan, Djibouti, East Timor, Gambia, Honduras, the Marshall Islands, Romania, and 
Tajikistan have ratified the Rome Statute. 
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certain countries from the ICC gives the impression of a license to kill. 
This kind of accommodation will make the court partial to non-party 
states such as the United States. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Most U.S. objections to the ICC are unfounded, premature, and 
speculative, and do not justify its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. As 
demonstrated, the U.S. seems to equate ICC jurisdiction over nationals of 
a state to mean the same thing as jurisdiction over the United States as a 
country. This grave misconstruction of the law is regrettable as it does 
not operate from ignorance of the law but from a deliberate distortion of 
international law . 
While Americans are worried that the ICC may become a tool in the 
hands of its enemies to prosecute United States servicemen deployed for 
peacekeeping operations, advocates of the ICC see it as an institution that 
will help save the lives of American soldiers. It is envisaged that the 
Court will serve as an avenue to promote international justice and 
individual accountability. Thus, the ICC will deter gross human rights 
violators by confronting them with the threat of punishment. In this way, 
the ICC will help to put a stop to future "ethnic cleansing" as occurred in 
Bosnia and Rwanda. 
Therefore, if the U.S. supports and strengthens the Court, it will no 
longer be necessary to put American servicemen's lives in danger by 
deploying them to such war-tom areas. Today, American soldiers in 
Bosnia and indeed allover the world are safer because the leading 
Bosnian Serb racists and their like in the former Republic of Yugoslavia 
are either in hiding or in prison, instead of inciting their followers to 
violence against U.S. peacekeepers.\92 
Most of the delegates at the ICC Conference were concerned that efforts 
to accommodate the United States demands may provide loopholes for 
the Pol Pots, Saddam Husseins, and Milosevices of tomorrow. 193 The 
general feeling of most of the nations at the Rome Conference, as 
expressed by Adriaan Bos,194 is that delegates have gone far enough to 
placate the U.S .. According to Mr. Bos, "efforts to reach compromises 
192. Jerry Fowler, U.S. Has Wounded International Justice, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 10,1998, at A21. 
193. Kirsch, supra note 41, at 11. 
194. Mr. Adriaan Bos, a Dutch Diplomat, was supposed to be the Chair of the Conference's 
primary deliberative body, the Committee of the Whole, but was diagnosed as having cancer weeks 
before the conference started and replaced by Canadian Phillippe Kirsch. 
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have been used to the maximum."'95 He cautioned that "we cannot let 
ourselves. destroy the essentials of an International Criminal Court ... a 
new institution that gives hope to the entire world that we can hope to 
bring to justice those who transgress the most basic human principles."'96 
A similar view was expressed in Professor Bassiouni's suggestion that 
the United States got most of what it wanted "within the folds of the 
agreement," if not explicitly.'97 He opined that U.S. officials did not get 
what they may really have been after, "a stamp across the front of the 
treaty that says this will never apply to the United States, but the United 
States can use it whenever it wants."198 Considering that most of the 
U.S.' objections are unfounded, this author cannot but agree with this 
view. Also, in an opinion piece published in the Washington Post, U.N. 
Secretary-General Dr. Kofi Annan noted that all signatories to 
international accords agree to assume similar risks. '99 He proffered that 
the contradiction in U.S. foreign policy2°O stems from the American 
attitude that says, "one law for us, another for everybody else."20' 
It would therefore appear that the U.S. prefers to stand outside a 
collective framework of international law to pursue its policies without 
hindrance by the rule of law which the majority of other democratic 
nations have accepted, and which it had introduced to others. The United 
States played a prominent role in the promulgation and enforcement of 
the Nuremberg principles, and it continues to play a significant role in 
the ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, for the U.S. to turn around and antagonize the ICC because it 
seeks jurisdiction over U.S. citizens is hypocritical. 
As eloquently opined by Justice Jackson, U.S. chief prosecutor for the 
Allies in the Nuremberg trials, if certain offenses are crimes, "they are 
crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does 
them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct 
against others which we would be unwilling to have invoked against 
195. John Hooper, U.S. Plan to Thwart War Crimes Court, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, July 26, 1998. 
196. [d. 
197. Podgers, supra note 137, at 69. 
198. [d. 
199. William Raspberry, Reflections in a Gentle Mirror, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,2002 at A15. 
200. For example, America's tendency to reach out internationally when it suits its purposes (as 
in the fight against terrorism - "Operation Enduring Freedom"), but to assume a go-it-alone posture 
when international cooperation seems inconvenient (as in U.S. baseless opposition to the ICC). 
201. [d. 
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US."202 He then declared that: "While the law is first applied against 
German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve any useful 
purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including 
those who sit here now injudgment.''203 
The United States cannot aspire to world leadership without holding the 
high moral ground. The assumption that its military and economic might 
are sufficient to lead the rest of the world amounts to naIve political 
computation. If there is any lesson to be learned from the events of 9/11 
and its aftermath, it is that a unilateral superpower structure cannot 
succeed in today's world. Rather than alienate itself from the ICC, the 
U.S. should team up with the rest of the world to enable the Court to 
proceed effectively, and assist in every way possible to bestow the 
strength and credibility required by the Court to achieve its objectives. 
The United States should rise to its responsibility as a country that 
cherishes freedom by cooperating with a system that will serve the 
profound needs of the international community to stigmatize criminal 
regimes and their policies in order to further the goals of international 
justice and morality. 
202. Christopher J. McGrath, Today's Transnational Crime Epidemic: The Necessity of an 
International Criminal Coun to Battle Misdeeds Which Transcend National Borders, 6 1. INT'L & 
PRAc. 135, 149 (1997). 
203. Id. 
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